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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1967

No. 67
JOHN

w.

TERRY,

ET AL.,

Petitioners,
-v.STATE OF

Omo,

Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

omo

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER, TERRY

Opinions Below
The opinion of tbe trial court, that is, the Court of
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, is ·officially reported
as State v. Chilton, et al., 95 Abs. 321 (September 22, 1964).
This opinion is printed herein in Appendix A, infra, page
27.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals f-0r Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, which affirmed the convictions of the petitioners by the trial court, is officially reported as State
v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. (2d) 122; 214 N. E. (2d) 114; 34
0. 0. (2d) 237 (February 10, 1966), and is printed herein
as Appendix B, infra, page 31.
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The Supreme Court of Ohio did not render any formal
opinion in dismissing the petitioners' appeals, sua sponte,
on the ground that no substantial constitutional question
was involved.

Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Supreme Court ·of Ohio was entered on the 19th day of October, 1966. Time for :filing
a petition for certiorari was extended by this Court from
January 17, 1967 to March 18, 1967. (Appendix C, infra,
page 43.) The petition was :filed March 17, 1967, and
granted May 2, 1967. U.S. (1967). The jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 (3).

Questions Presented

I.
Where the trial court makes a finding that the arrest of
the petitioners was unlawful, does the introduction of evidence against the petitioners, which was obtained as a result of the illegal arrests, violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

II.
Where evidence has been seized from the person of the
petitioners as the product of an illegal search and seizure,
whether the refusal of the court to apply search and seizure law, and the substitution therefor of a stop and frisk
doctrine, is a violation of the Fourth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
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m.
Where no emergency exists, and in the absence of probable cause, can a police ·officer acting upon bare suspicion
alone stop, frisk, and search petitioners for a gun -0n the
street, and can the Court of Appeals justify such conduct by
substituting a standard -0f "reasonably suspects" for the
"probable cause" set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

Constitutional Provisions Involved
The pertinent portions of the United States Constitution
are set .out below:
Amendment IV.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath ·Or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."
Amendment XIV.
" • • • Nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law

.. .

"

Statute Involved
Ohio Revised Code Section 2923.01 is set out herein as
Appendix D, infra, page 44.
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Statement of the Case
Petitioners herein were indicted, tried, convicted and
sentenced to the Ohio State Penitentiary for the offense -0f
Carrying a Concealed Weapon.
Prior to the trial, the Court conducted a hearing on petitioners' pre-trial motions to suppress the evidence, to-wit:
guns. The entire testimony on the motions to suppress consisted of the testimony Qf one police officer. The State's
entire case also consisted ·of the testimony of this -0ne
police officer. The Court overruled petitioners' motions to
suppress (R. 94, et seq.) and upon trial permitted into evidence, the guns, shells, and the testimony of the police
officer relating to custodial conversation with the petitioner,
Richard Chilton, in the jail house.
The police officer called to testify on both the motions
to suppress and the trial testified that his name was Martin
McFadden; that he had been a police office for 39 years
and four months; and that he had been assigned to the Detective Bureau for .35 years.
He further- testified that on the 31st day -0f October, 1963,
he first observed one John Terry and one Richard Chilton
standing at the corner of Huron Road and Euclid Avenue
where these two streets intersect at East 13th Street in the
City of Cleveland. That it was 2 :00 or 2 :30 p.m., and
that it was broad daylight. After observing these two
colored males standing at the corner talking, he positioned
himself in the lobby of Rogo:ff's store, near 14th Street on
·Huron Road, for the purpose of further observation. During a period of some 10-12 minutes, he ·observed that one
male would stand at the corner while the other one would
walk up Huron Road. That this male would stop and look
357
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into either Diamond Store or the United Airlines Office for
a second or so and then continue west -on Huron Road
near Halle Brothers Store. He would then turn around,
come back to the spot where the stores were, peer in the
window, and go back to the corner where he would talk
with the waiting male. Then the man who had been waiting would go through this same procedure. The testimony
with reference to the numbe! of trips each man made varied
from two to three times each to four to five time apiece.
(R. 14, 22, 24.)
During this 10 to 12 minute period of observation, the
officer stated that lrn saw a short, white man come over
to the corner, converse with these two colored males for
a minute or so, and then walk west on Euclid.
He then observed the two colored males walk west on
Euclid Avenue in a natural manner, and at Zucker's store,
1120 Euclid Avenue, he saw them stop in front of this
store and again converse with the same white male.
The officer further testified that these three men were just
standing in front of the store with their backs to the display
window; that they were just talking; and that he approached them and stated that he was a police officer. He
said that he asked them their names and that "they gave
it to me quick." (R. 17) (At all other places in the records
he says "they mumbled something.") Then without any
further conversation between the officer and these men,
and no overt act on the part of the men, the police officer
conducted himself as fallows:
"A. • • • I got Chilton then, not Chilton but Terry
and I turned him around and I stood in the back of
them, and I searched them, and in his upper left hand
pocket of his topcoat I felt a gun and I went in for it
358
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and I had a tough time getting it, so I took the coat
off. I at that time informed them, the three of them,
to keep their hands out of their pockets and walk into
the store. When they got into the store I told them
to face the wail, keep their hands away, and on searching Chilton in his left hand pocket of his topcoat I
found a gun, a '38, and searching Katz I found nothing." (R. 16, 17)
The three men were then taken to the Cleveland Police
Station where they were booked for "Investigation." A
day or so later, Terry and Chilton were charged with "Carrying a Concealed Weapon," a felony, and Katz was charged
with "Being a Suspicious Person," a misdemeanor.
The officer admitted that there were people on the street
when this matter occurred and that the stores were open
and that there was business as usual in the downtown area.
He admitted that he did not know any of these men (R.
44, 119) ; tha~ no one had furnished him any information
regarding them (R. 43, 44, 119); and that his reason for
watching them was that "they didn't look right to me at the
time." (R.119) With reference to his reason for approaching the men in front of Zucker's and turning Terry around
and patting him down, the ·officer testified as follows: "In
the :first place I didn't like their actions on Huron Road,
and I suspected them of casing a job, a stickup. That's
the reason." (R. 42) He said that he patted them down
" • • • to see what they had, if they had guns." (R. 42)
However, he testified under inquiry by the Court that in
39 years as a police officer and 35 years as a detective,
that he had no experience in observing individuals casing
a place and had never ·observed anybody casing a place.
(R. 46)
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ARGUMENT

I.
Where an Arrest Is Unlawful, Evidence Seized as a
Result Thereof and Used at the Trial Violates the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
The trial court in its opinion (R. 96) stated:
There is no evidence that any warrant had been issued
for a search or frisk and I am not going to stretch
the facts and say that there was a lawful arrest prior
to the frisk of the defendants. I believe it would be
stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension
and foolhardy to say there was a lawful arrest, because
there wasn't, from the facts as presented ...
And then reiterated this position later in this same opinion (R. 100):
I believe and I reiterate again that search and seizure law cannot be applied in this particular case, although 1'Ir. Reuben Payne endeavored to show there
was a lawful arrest, but the Court cannot agree. If
there was an arrest it came subsequent to the frisk ...
In setting forth its opinion regarding the question of
arrest, the Court was aware of the police officer's testimony which clearly demonstrated a lack of probable cause
for arrest at the time that he stopped and searched the petitioners. The clear absence of probable cause is best illustrated by the following examination of the police officer (R.
43, 44, 45):
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Q. Mr. McFadden, you just said you suspected them
of casing a job, is that correct Y A. That's right.
Q. You were basing this- A. Pardon Y
Q. You were basing this, suspecting them of casing
a job, upon your observations of them, sirY A. That's
right.
Q. Had anyone come up to you and given you any
information regarding these two men 7 A. Absolutely
no.
Q. Did you know these two men previously, sir? A.
I do not, I didn't know the men from Adam.
Q. ·This would include the white fellow, Officer? A.
I did not know the white man either. I never seen the
three men before.

•

•

•

•

•

Q. But when you walked up to these men and you
first spoke to them you did not know that these men
had guns on them, did you Y A. Absolutely not.
At the moment that the police officer appr-0ached the petitioners and the third man, it is apparent that he did not
have probable cause to arrest. Yet after perfunctorily saying to them that he was a police officer he then relates the
illegality of his actions as follows (R. 16, 17, 18):

Q. You were speaking to the three of them 1 A. All
three of them.
Q. Will you tell us exactly what you said to them,
Detective McFadden Y A. I said I was a police officer.
I asked each one their name, and they gave it to me
quick. I got Chilton then, not Chilton but Terry, and
I turned him around and I stood in the back of them,
and I searched them, and in his upper left-hand pocket
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of his topcoat I felt a gun and I went in for it and
I had a tough time getting it, so I took the coat off.
I at that time informed them, the three of them, to
keep their hands out -0f their pockets and walk into the
store.
When they got into the store I told them to face the
wall, keep their hands away, and on searching Chilton
in his left-hand pocket of '.his topcoat I found a gun;
a '38, and seaching Katz I found nothing.

•

• • •

•

Q. Now, taking you back for a moment to the point
where you said you were a police officer and you asked
their names, did each of them give you their names T
A. They said something.
Q. Was this the point at which time you grabbed
Terry and spun him around as you described T A.
That's right.
Q. K ow, had you said, other than saying to them,
"What are your names 1" Did you say anything else
at all to them before you spun Terry around T A.
No, I didn't, but I will say this-

• • • • •
Q. K ow, this gun that you found on Terry was
located where T A. In his upper left-hand topcoat
pocket.
Q. It was not visible to you just looking at him,
was it1 A. No.
In light of the foregoing, and it being apparent that
there was no probable cause for arrest prior to the search,
the Court was correct in making its finding that the arrest
in this case was not legal. Since, as the Court said, "if
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there was an arrest it came subsequent to the frisk," the
illegal search and seizure which yielded the gun cannot
provide the probable cause which was absent at the time of
the stop, the frisk, and the search. Therefore, based upon
its findings, it was incumbent upon the Court to suppress
the evidence which was the product of an illegal search
and seizure and the failure of the Court to suppress was
violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. :tYiapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Permitting the police to stop and frisk and thereby
acquire probable cause would no doubt subject some guilty
persons to the arms of the law. In the main, however, it
would leave the large majority of decent citizens subject to
the whim and caprice of police officers and on the street,
"stops", "pats", "frisks", and "searches".1 Resultantly,
the police might not acquire probable cause, but the citizen
would most assuredly surrender freedom and dignity without any redress for the temporary arrest and indignity
which yielded no illegal product and no probable cause.
The trial Court here ruled that there is a distinction between stopping and frisking and search and seizure. (R.
98). As a basis for such a distinction the Court cited
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) as being authority
for the States being able to establish their own rules and
standards pertaining to search and seizure so long as those
rules and standards do not violate the substance and spirit
of the Fourth Amendment.
It is impossible to square this distinction by the trial
Court with Ker in light of the court's reliance upon a term
1 52 Northwestern University Law Review 16, by Caleb Foote
(1957): Law and Police Practices: Safeguards in the Law of
Arrest.
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known as "reasonable cause",2 not heretofore known to be
either part substance or spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
...Vter stating that the police officer had "reasonable cause"
to approach them and pat them the court then said (R. 98) :
Had he gone into their pockets and obtained evidence,
an an example, narcotics or illegal slips, there would
be no question of an illegal search and seizure ...
The establishment of such a distinction, without a difference, and the refusal of the Court to apply search and
seizure law as set forth in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, and Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) is clearly violative -0f the Fourth
Amendment.
The pronouncement in Ker permitting the States to develop workable rules does not authorize them to establish
standards below the minimal ·ones required by the Fourth
Amendment. And, if the trial Court would have applied
search and seizure law to contraband found on the petitioners, he cannot deny them the Fourth Amendment protections merely because guns were found as a result of a
search, termed a "frisk".
2 "Book Review," by Yale Kamisar, 76 Harvard Law Review 1502
of Report and Recommendations of the Commissioners' Committee
on Police Arrests for Investigation, by Robert V. Murray wherein
Kamisar cites the following at page 1505 :
. . . the Fourth Amendment prohibits 'seizures' withou4
probable cause. No matter how frequently or deceptively the
word 'reasonable' is utilized in formulating a standard for
detentions or arrests for investigation-'reasonable circumstances,' 'reasonable suspicion,' 'reasonable grounds to suspect'
-any standard less than 'probable cause' is 'unreasonable' in
the constitutional sense.

Note: Kamisar's comment at page 1511:
I submit that many of the Uniform Arrest Act Provisions
were fatally defective as early as Wolf v. Colorado....
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Generically speaking, whether the police officer "frisks",
"taps", "pats", or "searches", the result is a search, 3 and
a search incident to an unlawful arrest is constitutionally
prohibited. There is no distinction where there is no probable cause. If one "taps", "pats", or "frisks", for narcotics
or policy slips, and the finding -0f them is an illegal search,
then also if one "taps", "pats", or "frisks", for a gun, and
finds it, it is still an illegal search.
Rather than providing the Trial Court with a basis for
distinction, J( er (at pp. 34-35), in fact sustains the petitioners entitlement to suppression. In its contortive effort
to sustain the frisk and illegal search without probable
cause the court failed to adhere to the portion of J( er
which was applicable to this situation, which is:
The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must
be the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest,
since the officers had no search warrant. The lawfulness of the search with~ut warrant, in turn, must be
based upon probable cause, which exists "where 'the
facts and circumstances within their (the officers')
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that'
an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar
v. United States, 338 D.S. 160, 175-176 (1949), quoting
3 \Vebster's
Third New International Dictionary, Volume I
(1961): "frisk ... 2a: to search or go through esp. for concealed
weapons or stolen articles ... esp. to search (a person) for such
purpose usually by running the hand rapidly over the clothing
and through the pockets ... "
Also see Webste:.:-'s Collegiate Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1948):
"Frisk ... 2. Slang. to search (a person) by running the hand
over the clothing, through pockets, etc. ; hence, to steal from in
such a manner."
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from Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132, 162 (1925);
accord, People v. Fischer, 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P. 2d 967
Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 178, 281
P. 2d 250 (1955).

II.

The Substitution of a Judicial "Stop and Frisk" Doctrine
for "Probable Cause" Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The lawfulness of the arrest in this case must be tested
by the Fourth Amendment, and since the arrest was without a warrant, it must be based upon probable cause. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 411 (1963); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
Probable cause cannot be retroactively supplied by the
evidence uncovered. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); City of Lakewood
v. Smith, 1 Ohio State, 2d 128 (1965).
The Ohio Court of Appeals justified their substitution of
a "stop and frisk" doctrine for "probable cause" on the
rationale that a police officer of thirty-nine years experiance "reasonably suspected" that the defendant was ''casing" a store with robbery in mind. 'T he Court then said:
"It was also logical for this experienced detective to presume that the defendant was armed and dangerous."
Yet we find such rationale to be contra to the actual facts
in the case. This is -demonstrated vividly in the following
colloquy between the police officer and the Court (R. 46,
47):
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By the Court:
Q. You have mentioned about casing a place. In
ordinary language what do you mean by casing? A. I
mean waiting for an opportunity.
Q. Of doing what? A. Of sticking the place up.
Q. In your thirty-nine years of experience as an
officer, and I believe you testified thirty-five years as a
detective--is that correct 1 A. That's correct.
Q. Have you ever had any experience in observing
the activities of individuals in casing a place 7 A. To
be truthful with you, no.
Q. You never observed anybody casing a place 7 A.
No.

• • • •

•

Q. What caused you specifically to be attracted to
those two individuals at the location that you have
mentioned, or let me put it to you this way:
Supposing those two defe~dants here that are now in
Court were standing across the street from here, and
doing the same activities that you observed them on
Huron and Euclid, would you have had any cause for
suspicion 7 A. I really don't know.
And this further testimony (R. 160):

Q. During your tenure as a police officer, during
your 39 years as a police officer, how many men have
you had -0ccasion to arrest when you had observed
them and felt as though they might pull a stick-up 7
A. To my recollection, I wouldn't know, I don't know if
I had-I don't remember of any.

• • •

•

•
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Q. You don't remember of any, is that the last partt
· A. That's true.

Then this same Court of Appeals fl:lrther justified their
ruling on the theory that the stopping and questioning of
suspicious persons is not prohibited by the Constitution.
(Appendix B, page 41) The court then proceeded to hold
as follows :
"Therefore, we hold, in line with the great weight of
authority, that a policeman may under appropriate
circumstances such as exist in this case, reasonably
inquire of a person concerning his suspicious on-thestreet behavior in the absence of reasonable grounds
to arrest. . . . "
Such a holding was made by the Court in spite of a record
which patently obviates any intention on the part of the
police officer to inquire. The record completely negatives
any such intention. Other. than announcing to these men
that he was a police officer and posing the singular question
to them "What are your names," it is uncontroverted that
no further questions were asked 'Of any of the three men
until the following day at the jail. See (R. 19, 20):

"Q. Now, did you at that point say anything further
to these three men 7 A. Not at that time, no.

•

•

•

• •

Q. Between the time you removed this gun from

Chilton, and the arrival of the other members of the
police department, did you have occasion to say anything further to either Chilton or 'Terry. A. N-0t that
I remember, no."
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Even suspicious conduct alone does not subject a person to 1-0ss of his immunity from search of his person and
exempt him from inclusion in the Fourth Amendment.
U.S. v. DiRe, 332 u.S. 481 (1948); People v. Ford, 356 Ill.
572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934); People v. lliacklin, 353 Ill. 64,
186 N.E. 531 (1933).
In considering whether the officer had probable cause for
arrest in accordance with law, these excerpts from his testimony are of prime importance :

1. When asked at what point he considered their actions unusual, his reply was (R. 118):
"Well, to be truthful with you, I didn't like them. I
was just attracted to them, and I surmised that there
was something going on when one of them left the
other one and did the walking up, walk up past the
store and stopped and looked in and came back again."

2. At R. 119:

"Q. You didn't know either one of these men did you?
A. I did not.
Q. And no one had furnished you any inforination
with regard to these two men, have they? A. Absolutely no information regarding these two men at all.
I am telling the truth when I say that."

3. At ·R. 121:
"Q. Now when you saw this white man come over and
and talk to the two of them, there at the corner of
Huron and 14th, did you know this white man 1 A.
N-0, I didn't.

369

17
Q. You had no information with reference to this
white man Y A. No information on anything that I on anything that I seen, anything that I seen I had n-0
information whatsoever on."
4. At R. 129-134:

"Q. vV ell, you tell the court as y-0u walked through
the door you said 'Order the wagon' and as you further
say you were then arresting Chilton, Terry and Katz-A. That's right.

• •

•

•

•

Q. 'Vhat were Chilton and Katz being arrested fort
A. Association.
Q. Is that your complete answer, sirY A. Well,
they were found in company with a man with a revolver.
Q. So then at that point they were being arrested
for Association Y A..They were being arrested, yes,
period.
Q. Do you know of any charge under Ohio Law entitled 'Association' 1

•

•

•

•

•

A. As far as I lmow, I don't know."
In view of the above it is apparent that the inquiry
which the officer intended was physical and not verbal,
and that he had substituted "a hunch" for pr-0bable cause.
His obvious intention then was to search in order to acquire probable cause. However, the after-the-event justification does not create probable cause. An arrest without
a warrant by-passes the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause. It substitutes
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instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event
justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly
influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight j ndgment. Beck v. Ohio, supra, 142; Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479, 480 (1963).
This Court has already made it clear that good faith on
the part of the arresting officer is not enough. Beck v.
Ohio, supra; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959). An Ohio case in point is Rasey, et al. v. Ciccolino,
Admx. 1 Ohio App. 194; 18 C.C. (NS) 331; 24 C. D. 294
(1913).
Taking the evidence in this case in its best light, considering that the police officer did not know any of these men;
had no information on any them; had no knowledge of the
commission of a misdemeanor or felony; had no warrant
for search or arrest; and attempted no interrogation of the
arrestees ; this arrest occurred on the · basis of susp1c1on
alone. Such an arrest is, of_ course, illegal.'
4 See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307; 3 LBd 2d 327; 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959) wherein he
quoted from an article written by Professors Hogan and Snee of
Georgetown University, 47 Georgetown Law Journal 1, 22: "It
must be borne in mind that any arrest based on suspicion alone
is illegal. This indisputable rule of law has grave implications
for a number of traditional police investigative practices. The
round-up or dragnet arrest, the arrest on suspicion, for questioning, for investigation or on an open charge all are prohibited by
law. It is undeniable that if those arrests were sanctioned by law,
the police would be in a position to investigate a crime and to
detect the real culprit much more easily, much more efficiently,
much more economically, and with much more dispatch. It is
equally true, however, that society cannot confer such power on
the police without ripping away much of the fabric of a way of
life which seeks to give the maximum of liberty to the individual
citizen. The finger of suspicion is a long one. In an individual case
it may point to all of a certain race, age group of locale. Com-
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Even less than what occurred here would have constituted
arrest for in ·order for there to be an arrest, it is not necessary that there be an application of actual force, or manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint which may be
visible to the eye, or a formal declaration of arrest. It is
sufficient if the person arrested understands that he is in
the power of the one arresting, and submits in consequence. Kelly v. United States, 111 U.S. App. D. C. 396
(1961).
When the police officer, without probable cause, approached these three men who had committed no crime,
and who were standing on a public street conversing, and
were restricted of their liberty of movement, and subjected
to search in public view, their arrest was complete. The
product of such a search was illegal as the act which produced the fruit.

manly it extends to any ·who have committed similar crimes in the
past. Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic
human right of liberty. It can be tolerated only in a society which
is willing to concede to its government powers which history and
experience teach are the inevitable accoutrements of tyranny."
Also see Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, by William 0.
Douglas, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 70 Yale
Law Journals, at page 12 : "There is no crime known as 'suspicion'
nor is there any Federal crime known as 'holding' for 'investigation' ... Arrests for suspicion are not countenanced by the Bill
of Rights. 'l'he Fourth Amendment allows arrests-as well as
searches-only for 'probable cause'. . .. Under our system the
arrest is warranted not by what the police discover afterwards but
by what they knew at the time . . . The result is that arrests
on 'suspicion' are unconstitutional at the local, as well as at the
federal level."
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m.
Substituting the Standard "Reasonably Suspects" for
"Probable Cause" Violates the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
This Court has made it plain that federal applications
of Fourth Amendment concepts, while not placing a
straight-jacket on state process, does provide a minimal
standard for all courts. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963). In fine, Ker provides a foundation upon which the
State courts may build but not undermine:
Findings of reasonableness ... [by state trial courts]
are respected ·only insofar as consistent with federal
constitutional guarantees. As we have stated above
and in other cases involving federal constitutional
rights, findings ·o f state courts are by no means insulated against examination here. . . . (bracketed material supplied) Ker v. C(Llifornia, at pp. 33-34
When the Ohio Cour.t of Appeals asserts:
. ·.. There is no mandate in the Mapp opm1on that
the states henceforth must abide by all the interpretations of the federal courts. (Appendix B, page 41)
it ignores Ker and misstates the rule by half. The thrust
of J(er is that the States may extend, but not contract
federal applications of the Fourth Amendment.
Relying on its own dictum the Court of Appeals decision5 proceeds to rationalize it pragmatically by stating
5 The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the petitioners' appeals
sua sponte without opinion on the ground no substantial constitutional question was involved.
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flatly that "The necessities of law enforcement in large
urban areas require the procedures utilized in the instant
case". (Appendix B, page 31) 6
In the interest of this purportedly pragmatic objective
the Court of Appeals hinges the propriety of the ultimate
arrest largely upon whether the detective in this case had,
in the first place, a right to stop and question the petitioners
--- that enterprise-acquired "reasonable grounds"
and-from
to make the frisk, which produced the gun and validated
the consequent arrest. (Appendix B, pp. 39-41)

This syllogism is used by the Court t-0 uphold the police
action and the admissibility of the acquired evidence even
though there was no. ground ·for arrest prior to the questioning (R. 47, 118-121), nothing in response to the questioning to raise probable cause (or for that matter reasonable ground or any other ground) for arrest (R. 16-20),
and no arrest until after the petitioners had been physically
handled (R. 127) 1 becaus~ of the detective's feeling that
"they may have a gun" (R. 44-47, 118-121, 137), and the
guns discovered.
In this posture, these petitioners and, more importantly,
all citizens are at the mercy of the police "sixth sense"
and the situation is not improved by the Appellate Court's
arrest liturgy:

"It is readily apparent that a required element of an
arrest is the intent of the officer to arrest. . . . In t11.e
We resist the temptation to comment o:LJ. the implication that
observance of constitutional standards undercuts la"{ enforcement.
6

The Court of Appeals below specifically held that the arrest did
not take place until after the officer found the gun. (See Appendix B, p. 39.) Necessarily the "search", i.e. frisk, preceded the
cause for arrest on the facts of this case.
7
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instant case, when the detective approached the defendant, he had, ... no intention at all to arrest, but
only to inquire as to the defendant's activities." (Appendix B, p. 37)
For whatever may be said of intent as an element in arrest, on this record there was nothing in the questioning
to raise probable cause to arrest (only names were asked
for and given R. 17) and no arrest made until after a
physical invasion of the petitioners' persons and, therefore,
no justification for the search as incidental to a valid arrest.8 This obvious point ought not be blurred or glossed
over by simple incantation about intent.
It is apparent the Court below treated "reasonable
grounds" as a standard less demanding than "probable
cause". 9 What it is saying, in effect, is that an ·occasion
for questioning which raises no probable cause may legalize
a search which may yield fruits in turn legalizing an arrest
and it matters little whether one talks of "reasonable
grounds" or "probable cause" for both depend upon the
illegal acquisition £.or their existence. Petitioners had
thought the day long past when "fruits" would qualify a
search.

The argument that necessity requires such a result ought
not to be persuasive. There has never been a time when
To avoid illegal arrest, the court below apparently finds no
arrest. Even if this was an aid, it is possible to wonder what
petitioner's status was as the detective's sixth sense took him into
and through petitioners' pockets.
8

Any problem in equating probable cause and reasonable grounds
was avoided in Berger v. New York (S. Ct. 6/12/67) 35 L. W. 4649,
4652 by the parties' agreement that the concepts were equivalent
under the New York law.
9
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some practical argument could not be mounted to justify
law enforcement outrages. No doubt the thumb-screw and
the rack would "aid" law enforcement from some points
of view. However, we have staked our Constitutional and
governmental lives on the policy of the Fourth Amendment
-a policy no doubt that involves some risk. But "Constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take
some chances'', Mr. Justice Holmes in Blinn v. Nel,son,
222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911).
And it is a serious question whether ordered government
does not run greater risks from tinkering with the fundamental concepts [e.g. the substitution of "reasonable
grounds", a term of little experienced content for probable
cause-a concept made meaningful by extensive interpretation] than in adhering steadfastly to constitutional fundamentals. However, it is again emphasized that a wordy
formulation will not cure the evil here. For the fruits of
an illegal search were used to justify an arrest which concededly came after the search.
The struggle for liberty has been too long and too bitter
to surrender the privacy of one's person to the subjective
vagaries ·of a policeman's mind. It is not his intent nor his
sixth sense which must determine constitutional rights
but objective facts supporting probable cause and no warrantless invasion of the person can stand unless present
probable cause for arrest has culminated in arrest before
the intrusion.
The Court below finds historical support for its view
that "proper" authority may stop and question persons
in suspicious circumstances. We are told that this "right"
to question has roots in "early English practice where it
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_was approved by the courts and common law commentators". (Appendix B, p. 31) One may concede a right to
stop and question under proper circumstances without
ever reaching the heart -of the question in the present case.
For in this case far more than questioning is involved.
Here, the questioning did not go beyond identification.
Therefore, there was no reason for the invasion of the
person which took place. Under such circumstances early
English authority is of little consequence. Nonetheless it is
worth noting that the F-ourth Amendment is, in large measure, a product of a revolution against English law as applied
to the American colonies. It is not an accident that so
many colonies adopted bills of rights -0r their equivalent
nor that so many emphasized their abhorence of general
warrants. See, p.e. The Virginia Declaration of Rights,
10. Moreover, security for liberty is planted in quicksand
if too much confidence is placed in support acquired from
English law in the 17th and 18th Centuries. The .Areopagitica was not generated by a free press and history can
provide many English examples unduly limiting liberties
now taken for granted both here and in England. See Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights-1776-1791 Chapter
l.10 It can never be emphasized enough that those liberties
were not secured by ambiguous exceptions to basic safeguards.
The Fourth Amendment is essentially a procedural guarantee. As such it protects those "indispensable essence[s]
-0f liberty" so dramatically described by Mr. Justice Jack1 ° Collier Books Edition 1962. Originally published by the University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia.
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son m Shaitghnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 224
(1953):
Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can
answer that procedures matter not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence
of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured
if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed,
if put to the choice, one might well pref er to live under
Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our
common-law procedures than under our substantive
law enforced by Soviet procedural practices.
Petitioners urge this Court to preserve the procedural
essence of the Fourth Amendment by repudiating the exception carved out by the court below, accompanied by a clear
direction that State procedures will satisfy Due Process
·only if Federal constitutional standards are observed.

Conclusion
It is our position that the substitution of a stop and frisk
doctrine or any standard less than the probable cause
standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment violates both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
We invite an independent examination of the record in
this case by this Court in order to determine the petitioners'
constitutional rights. In Beck v. Ohio, supra, this Court
said:
. . . While the Court does not sit as in nisi prius to
appraise contradictory factual questions, it will, where
necessary to the determination of constitutional rights,
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make an independent examination of the facts, the
findings, and the record so that it can determine for
itself whether in the state court findings, such as a
finding as to the reasonableness of a search and seizure, the constitutional criteria established by the Supreme Court have been respected.
In view of this, we cannot believe that where the trial
court has found an arrest to be unlawful, that it can then
admit evidence seized incident to the unlawful arrest, refuse to apply search and seizure law, and justify the same
on a doctrine of "stop and frisk". Justice Roger J. Traynor
in his article, ":Mapp vs. Ohio at large in the Fifty States,"
Duke Law Journal, Volume 1962, page 319, said this:
The exclusionary rule of 1961 that now binds all the
states is no mere rule of evidence, but part and parcel
of the Constitution. It took time to deliver it to its
destiny, but there is no longer any question that it has
arrived.
This conviction should be reversed and the evidence suppressed.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK
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